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A Tale of Two Injustices
Epistemic Injustice in Philosophy
Emmalon Davis
1. Introduction
This chapter has two aims. I articulate and defend a conceptual tool for thinking 
about epistemic injustice. I utilize this tool to develop a partial explanation for the 
persistent lack of diverse practitioners in academic philosophy.1 Academic phil­
oso phy has been amply observed to lack diversity in (at least) two ways:
 (i) Academic philosophy lacks diversity with respect to the social identities of 
its practitioners. Women, gender minorities, and people of color are 
among those notably underrepresented and marginalized within the field.2
 (ii) Academic philosophy lacks diversity with respect to the kinds of 
 discourses in which its practitioners are engaged. Contributors engaged in 
race and gender discourses—including, for example, philosophy of race 
and feminist philosophy—are among those notably underrepresented and 
marginalized in the field.3
1 This chapter concerns academic philosophy as it is practiced in the United States and the so­ 
called English­ speaking world. While I focus especially on race and gender disparities in philosophy, 
I intend for my analysis to extend more broadly, where applicable, to other underrepresented groups 
(e.g. ability, class, sexual orientation, etc.).
2 Concerning women in philosophy, see Alcoff (2003); Haslanger (2008); Calhoun (2009); Antony 
(2012); Hutchison and Jenkins (2013); and Paxton et al. (2012). Concerning black women and women 
of color, see Yancy (2008); Belle [Gines] (2011); Russell (2019); Narayan (2003); Wilson (2017); and 
Lee (2017). Concerning trans and non­ binary persons, see Bettcher (2018) and Dembroff (forthcom­
ing). Concerning blacks, see Yancy (1998) and Botts et al. (2014). Concerning indigenous persons, see 
Waters (2003) and Whyte (2017). Concerning Asian and Asian Americans, see Lee (2014) and Kim 
(2002). Concerning Latinx persons, see Gracia (2008); Yancy (2012); and Madva (2016). While this 
chapter aims to articulate commonalities that bear explanatory relevance for the underrepresentation 
and marginalization of the groups outlined above, my analysis may not resonate uniformly with every 
member within and across these groups.
3 Concerning feminist philosophy, see Walker (2005); Haslanger (2008); Rooney (2011); and 
Superson (2011). Concerning philosophy of race, see Outlaw (1996); Mills (1997); Haslanger (2008); 
and Yancy (2012). I also intend for my analysis to encompass a wider range of discourses, some of 
which are and some of which are not situated under the more general categories of race, feminist, or 
gender philosophy: e.g. philosophy of disability (Tremain  2018); trans philosophy (Bettcher  2018), 
black feminist philosophy (James 2014); queer theory (Salamon 2009); Africana philosophy (Outlaw 
1996), indigenous philosophy (Whyte  2017), Indian political philosophy (Krishnamurthy  2016), 
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As I show, these disparities are epistemically connected. Practitioners outlined in 
(i) and (ii) are both targets of epistemic injustice in academic philosophy; while 
the former are targeted in virtue of their social identities, the latter are targeted in 
virtue of the content of their contributions. To illuminate this connection, I dis­
tinguish between two varieties of testimonial injustice: identity­ based and 
content­ based testimonial injustice. Utilizing these twin concepts, I offer an epi­
stem ic explanation that plausibly contributes to our understanding of the demo­
graphic disparities observed.4
Specifically, I argue that identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice 
are both prevalent in academic philosophy and that this prevalence introduces 
substantial barriers to participation for those targeted. Both identity­ based and 
content­ based testimonial injustice give rise to similarly injurious effects. For 
example, targets of either form of testimonial injustice may find it more difficult 
to shape the direction of inquiry, to secure credit for their contributions, and to 
find platforms through which to disseminate their ideas. They may be flatly 
ignored, dismissed, or interrupted. Their credibility may be openly questioned, 
and they may be pre­ emptively denied opportunities to participate in an 
exchange. In a discipline like philosophy, the practice of which predominately 
transpires through written and spoken discourse, such epistemic and  communicative 
hurdles are prohibitive. Thus, the dual and compounding effects of identity­ based 
and content­ based testimonial injustice in academic philosophy plausibly contribute 
to the lack of diversity concerning both the social identities of practitioners and the 
discourses in which practitioners are engaged.
Diverse practitioners are disproportionately represented at every level of aca­
demic philosophy—from student majors to doctoral students to faculty. Empirical 
research has suggested that the most significant decline in representation occurs 
prior to the Ph.D.  stage (Paxton et al.  2012; Beebee and Saul  2011; Botts et al. 
2014). As this chapter demonstrates, epistemic injustice is harmful at all ranks 
of the discipline, but I argue that there is good reason to think its effects are par­
ticularly pernicious at the earliest stages of philosophical exposure. On the 
account I am developing, students who experience, or anticipate experiencing, 
testimonial injustice in the formal and informal spaces in which they are exposed 
to academic philosophy—for example, lecture halls, seminar rooms, departmen­
tal talks, hallways and common spaces, reading rooms, student clubs, etc.—are 
decolonial philosophy (Maldonado­ Torres 2011), among others. While this chapter explores unifying 
factors contributing to a shared displacement within the field, a more comprehensive analysis would 
also examine commitments of individual discourses and unique forms of exclusion attendant to each.
4 See Thompson (2017) for a survey of proposed hypotheses and existing empirical research. As 
Thompson notes, the empirical literature has focused almost exclusively on philosophy’s gender gap, 
without sufficient attention to the underrepresentation of other identities or their intersections. 
Consequently, the range of hypotheses offered do not generally acknowledge the differential barriers 
experienced by non­ white (especially black and indigenous), first­ generation, disabled, trans, non­ 
binary, etc. persons in pursuing higher education or academic careers in philosophy.
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uniquely disincentivized from pursuing philosophy further. An unequal epistemic 
playing field provides ample reason for even the most promising practitioners to 
seek alternative educational and employment opportunities.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I distinguish between 
 identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice and consider cases in which 
these injustices discourage participation in philosophy. In section 3, I articulate 
three ways in which a philosophical discourse may become social identity­ coded, 
such that identity prejudice (or other unwarranted assessments) influence epistemic 
appraisals of the discourse and its contributors. In section 4, I distinguish my 
 proposal from three extant accounts: the “different voices,” “schema clash,” and 
“culture of justification” accounts. In the remaining sections, I address potential 
objections to my analysis. In section 5, I respond to the objection that my analysis 
is unable to account for the “uniqueness” (at least amongst the humanities) of 
philosophy’s diversity problem. In section 6, I address the concern that my ana lysis 
employs a distinction without a difference; I argue that although identity­ based 
and content­ based testimonial injustice are inextricably linked, the phenomena 
should not be collapsed. In section 7, I respond to the challenge that content­ based 
testimonial injustice is inappropriately characterized as an epi stem ic injustice, in that 
it lacks the central epistemic harm associated with trad ition al (e.g. identity­ based) 
forms. I argue that the distinction between identity­ based and content­ based 
 testimonial injustice illuminates two modes of epistemic subjectivity, both of 
which can be harmfully thwarted by epistemic injustice.
2. Identity- Based and Content- Based Testimonial Injustice
As it has been conventionally—but not uncontestably5—defined, testimonial 
injustice picks out “the injustice that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated cred­
ibil ity from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part” 
(Fricker 2007, 4). Identity prejudice, on this view, is prejudice that targets persons 
in virtue of their social group identities (e.g. their gender, race, ability, etc.). 
Testimonial injustice can lead to the dismissal or rejection of the target’s contri­
bution, or, operating pre­ emptively, it can prevent the target from being appropri­
ately consulted or otherwise epistemically acknowledged. To illustrate, consider 
a doctor, Paul, who refuses to accept the testimony of a patient, Sammi, 
 concerning her chronic pain, where this refusal is at least partially attributable to 
ableist and sexist stereotypes about the physical manifestations of chronic illness 
and women’s credibility concerning their own bodies. “You look fine to me,” Paul 
tells her, adding that most of his patients “are in wheelchairs.” Insofar as Sammi’s 
5 See Medina (2011); Dotson (2012a); Anderson (2012); Pohlhaus Jr (2014).
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doctor assigns her an identity prejudicial credibility deficit, she experiences a 
familiar form of testimonial injustice. Let us call this identity- based testimonial 
injustice.
Identity­ based testimonial injustice can be contrasted with another form of 
testimonial injustice. A contributor may be prejudicially (or otherwise unjustly) 
assessed not only owing to social identity, but also owing to the kind of informa­
tion one attempts to convey. Indeed, the content of a contributor’s contribution 
can itself become social identity­ coded in ways that provoke unwarranted epi­
stem ic assessments of the contributor and contribution. To illustrate, consider 
several doctors at a medical conference who have gathered for drinks to discuss 
their favorite sessions. One doctor, Preston, begins to report to the group what he 
has learned during a session on fibromyalgia (a condition of recent interest to 
him, since several of his patients may be affected). Just as Preston begins to share, 
a fellow doctor, James, chimes in: “Preston, I’m gonna have to stop you right 
there. Everyone knows those patients are just looking for attention. There’s a rea­
son it only affects women!” Preston tries to respond, but James sharply interrupts 
Preston to tell the group about what he has learned in a session on new develop­
ments in robot­ assisted joint replacement. As James’s commentary makes quite 
clear, his dismissal of Preston’s testimony owes itself to a gender association 
between fibromyalgia and women coupled with a prejudicial assessment of 
women (with chronic pain) as “attention­ seekers.” James pre­ emptively dismisses 
Preston’s contribution—essentially preventing Preston from sharing with the 
group what he has learned about fibromyalgia—in virtue of prejudice occasioned 
by identity­ coded content in Preston’s contribution. Moreover, James calls into 
question Preston’s own credibility by suggesting that his contribution has no 
merit. Let us call this content- based testimonial injustice.6 Like its counterpart, 
content­ based testimonial injustice can lead to the dismissal or rejection of the 
target’s contributions. It can also operate pre­ emptively, when an audience pre­
vents a target from contributing when certain content is anticipated.
In both cases, the underlying prejudices concern women and people with 
chronic pain. While Sammi experiences an identity­ based testimonial injustice, 
in virtue of her social identity as a woman with chronic pain, Preston experiences 
a content­ based testimonial injustice, in virtue of his attempt to engage others in 
a discourse associated with women and persons with chronic pain. The epistemic 
harm to Sammi is direct; her epistemic interests as a knower and contributor have 
been severely hampered by her doctor, affecting not only her standing as an 
6 Relatedly, see Dembroff and Whitcomb (forthcoming) who argue for the existence of “content­ 
focused epistemic injustice,” a similar phenomenon, which they distinguish from testimonial in just­
ice. Though our accounts developed independently, I take our shared recognition of the importance of 
content in epistemic injustice to be mutually supportive.
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epi stem ic agent, but also, more broadly, her health and well­ being. In 
Preston’s  case, James’s dismissal reflects an attitude of epistemic denigration 
towards women and people with chronic pain and derails a discursive exchange 
in which a group of doctors might have learned something from their peer about 
fibro myal gia. In this way, James’s dismissal of Preston harms the epistemic inter­
ests of people with chronic illnesses and of women, more generally, in their 
capacities to be known, valued, and understood. Insofar as content­ based testi­
monial injustice results in the dismissal and rejection of contributors whose con­
tributions are associated with or concern the interests of persons with unjustly 
devalued social identities, it takes on a broader epistemic (and social) 
significance.
For our purposes, then, I contrast the following two forms of testimonial injustice:
Identity- based: prejudice or other unjust assessments regarding a contributor’s 
social identity (e.g. gender, race, ability, etc.) influence an audience’s evaluation of 
the contributor’s epistemic standing (e.g. credibility, competence, value, etc.), 
compromising the audience’s willingness to consider or fairly engage the con­
tribu tor and contribution.
Content- based: prejudice or other unjust assessments regarding social 
 identity- coded content (e.g. gender­ coded, race­ coded, ability­ coded, etc.) of a 
con tribu tor’s contribution influence an audience’s evaluation of the contributor’s 
epistemic standing (e.g. credibility, competence, value, etc.), compromising the 
audience’s willingness to consider or fairly engage the contributor and contribution.
Importantly, identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice can occur 
independently. That is, persons with non­ dominant social identities can ex peri ence 
epistemic harms via identity­ based testimonial injustice, regardless of the content of 
their contributions. Similarly, persons whose contributions are non­ dominant social 
identity­ coded can experience epistemic harms via content­ based testimonial 
injustice, regardless of their social identities. It is also possible, however, for a 
contributor to be vulnerable with respect to both forms of testimonial injustice 
simultaneously. In such cases, the overlapping and intersecting epi stem ic effects 
for such contributors may be difficult to disentangle. As I show, however, the 
 distinction is nonetheless conceptually and practically useful.
Let us now turn to philosophy. To see how identity­ based and content­ based 
testimonial injustice disadvantage diverse practitioners in philosophy, consider 
the following. Lina is an undergraduate woman of color who has taken a few phil­
oso phy courses but has yet to add it as a major. Lina greatly enjoys the ideas 
explored in her classes and values the skills she is developing. One of her profes­
sors has even suggested she consider pursuing a career in philosophy. But several 
experiences have rendered her uncertain about whether philosophy is the right 
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choice for her. (N.B. Although these cases are presented as vignettes, they are not 
hypothetical.)
Page Forty- Five
Lina is the only woman and the only student of color in her small in­ class dis­
cussion group. The group has been assigned to discuss what (white male) phil oso­
pher P means when he says x. Lina suggests several times that the group turn to 
page forty­ five in the assigned text, a page she believes contains crucial clues con­
cerning what philosopher P means by x. The first few times Lina proposes the 
suggestion she is ignored, until finally one student jumps in quickly to respond 
that one should not read too much into any single passage. Throughout the 
exchange, the professor either does not notice she is being unfairly dismissed or 
simply does not intervene on her behalf. Lina stops participating in the conversa­
tion. After the discussion goes in circles for nearly ten minutes, another student 
states that he has found something important on page forty­ five. The rest of the 
group dutifully turns to page forty­ five, while that student reads aloud the passage 
Lina had underlined and starred in her own copy. At least she had the right idea, 
she thinks to herself.
Student Colloquia
Lina has finished a philosophy final paper exploring the influence of women in 
the meditative tradition before Descartes. Lina’s professor was very pleased with it 
and encouraged her to present the paper at the philosophy student colloquia club 
in order to get feedback and to meet more of the majors. As she is marking her 
name on the sign­ up sheet to present, a male peer—who happens to be the organ­
izer—says he is happy to see that Lina is interested in presenting, since it’s usually 
the same few people, and the club could really use some new participants. The 
organizer then asks Lina what she is going to present on. After Lina shares her 
topic, the organizer scrunches up his face and says, “Here’s a suggestion—don’t 
present on that. Nobody wants to hear about that! Do you have any other 
papers?”
Animal Ethics
Lina is taking a course on animal ethics. She is intrigued, but not quite convinced, 
by the arguments she has been studying. In order to think through one of the 
arguments further, Lina decides to discuss it with another philosophy student 
with whom she has had a prior class, since he seemed to know a lot about phil­
oso phy. When Lina tries to start a conversation with him, he is dismissive of the 
topic and mocks Lina’s enthusiasm. Before walking away, he jokes about shooting 
animals for the fun of it. Lina never broaches the subject again with him. A few 
months later, Lina discovers that this student has become a committed vegan. 
Surprised, Lina asks a mutual friend when this student became vegan. The friend 
reports that the student heard about moral veganism from another male peer 
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(who also took the animal ethics class), which subsequently sparked his interest. 
Lina wonders why she was not able to sustain this student in conversation on the 
topic a few months prior.
As these cases demonstrate, Lina is consistently denied the opportunity to make 
valuable contributions to discussion, to receive acknowledgement for suggestions 
that are originally her own, to start a conversation with peers that might result in 
philosophical insight (even personal growth), and to secure uptake for and gener­
ate interest in a new idea, where each of the aforementioned is integral to the 
pursuit of philosophy. While Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice primarily 
concerns assertions, Christopher Hookway (2010) has persuasively argued that 
something like testimonial injustice affects a much wider range of epistemic con­
tributions. In contrast to Fricker’s “informational perspective,” Hookway draws 
our attention to what he calls the “participant perspective” (157), a perspective 
from which other aspects of an epistemic exchange—for example, “asking ques­
tions, floating ideas, [and] considering alternative possibilities” (155)—become 
salient. I follow Hookway in acknowledging the epistemic significance of these 
further modes of participation. Thus, though I continue (for the sake of termino­
logical parsimony) to refer to the phenomena under investigation as “testimonial 
injustice,” I am expressly concerned with barriers to epistemic participation in 
this much broader sense.7
In each case, Lina’s interlocutors preclude her participation, but the distinction 
between identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice can provide a 
more nuanced diagnosis of each case. In “Page Forty­ Five,” Lina is the only 
woman and the only person of color in her discussion group. It is presumably 
because of her social identity as a woman of color that she has difficulty securing 
the epistemic standing she needs to ensure that her contribution—which contains 
no ostensible identity­ coded content—is taken seriously by her interlocutors; for 
the same exact contribution, when offered by a white male student, is received by 
her peers with no difficulty at all.
In “Student Colloquia,” Lina is preemptively dismissed by her male peer 
because of what she intends to contribute, namely, a paper concerning the philo­
soph ic al influence of women in the meditative tradition before Descartes. For the 
organizer doesn’t object to the fact that Lina is signing up to present. In fact, he 
seemed quite happy at first. His reproach only comes after he discovers her pro­
posed paper topic. What marks Lina out for dismissal in this case—i.e. “don’t 
present on that”—is the gendered content of her intended contribution. (Indeed, 
it’s not hard to imagine that even a white, male student intending to present on 
the same topic might encounter some pushback.)
7 For those who prefer to adopt a different term instead of testimonial injustice, perhaps “epistemic 
participation injustice” would suffice.
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In “Animal Ethics,” Lina has difficulty sustaining her peer in a casual conversation 
on the topic of animal welfare, while another male student successfully sparks 
interest in the same topic on a different occasion. This case may be best theorized 
as a hybrid case. Lina’s peer may be dismissive of her both because of her social 
identity and because he perceives animal ethics to be an “un­ masculine” topic.8 
That Lina’s peer at least loosely connects animal ethics and masculinity might 
be  evidenced by his comments about shooting animals for fun—a reference 
to   hunting, stereotypically characterized as a (white) “man’s sport.” If some 
 combination of identity­ based and content­ based dismissal is at work in this case, 
this could explain why Lina’s peer demonstrates increased willingness to engage 
the topic when it is later broached by a fellow male student. If my analysis is 
plaus ible, then “Page Forty­ Five” illustrates identity­ based testimonial injustice, 
while “Student Colloquia” illustrates content­ based testimonial injustice. “Animal 
Ethics” illustrates a hybrid case.
When epistemic injustice occurs with frequency in a given domain, those tar­
geted have reason to participate less often in such spaces or to avoid those spaces 
altogether (so as to avoid the annoyance, anger, or embarrassment associated 
with being targeted). Striving to succeed in a domain in which one is sys tem at ic­
al ly and unjustly subjected to externally imposed epistemic and communicative 
disadvantages is, minimally, frustrating; at worst, it compromises one’s ability to 
reach one’s full potential in that domain. Lina is interested in philosophy. She has 
taken several courses. She has even received encouragement from faculty. In 
many ways, this is a best­ case scenario. Nevertheless, it would hardly seem shock­
ing if Lina’s experiences lead her to conclude that, despite philosophy’s attrac­
tions, people with her identity or people with her interests, or both, are better off 
in other disciplines instead.
3. Social Identity- Coded Discourses in Philosophy
On the view I am developing, content­ based testimonial injustice occurs when 
the content of a contributor’s contribution becomes identity­ coded, such that 
associations with a particular social identity become affixed to the content in 
question. But how does this happen? Taking gender and race as our starting 
point, let me develop this idea.
Carol Cohn defines gender as “a system of meanings,” comprised of “ways of 
thinking, images and words that first shape how we experience, understand, and 
represent ourselves” (1993, 228–9). Profoundly entrenched and oppressively 
8 For discussion, see Ruby and Heine (2011) and Rothgerber (2013).
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re sili ent, the gender system permeates many facets of human life—from the toys 
and clothes with which children are outfitted, to the bathrooms people are expected 
to use, to the amount of compensation allotted for equivalent performances, to the 
opportunities available for social, political, and economic advancement, and so 
on. Gender associations usher in normative expectations that inform social 
 practices of valuation and devaluation in accordance with prevalent gender 
 stereotypes and ideologies (Valian  1998). Often, the association of a devalued 
gender identity with particular activities, traits, objects, or spaces transfers attitudes 
of devaluation thereto.
Race, alongside gender, permeates and structures human activities and the 
spaces in which those activities take place. For example, race influences which 
regions receive aid in natural disaster (and how quickly); which neighborhoods 
are allocated effective resources for self­ protection, economic development, and 
education; and which persons are presumed innocent or guilty when shopping in 
stores or walking down the street. Race gives rise to normative expectations, 
which determine, among other things, which spaces, places, and activities are val­
ued and which persons within those spaces are treated with respect. Accordingly, 
Charles Mills argues that:
[t]he norming of space is partially done in terms of the racing of space, the 
depiction of space as dominated by individuals . . . of a certain race. At the same 
time, the norming of the individual is partially achieved by spacing it, that is, 
representing it as imprinted with the characteristics of a certain kind of space. 
So this is a mutually supporting characterization that . . . becomes a circular 
indictment: “You are what you are in part because you originate from a certain 
kind of space, and that space has those properties in part because it is inhabited 
by creatures like yourself.” (1997, 40–1)
As Mills suggests, the “racing” and “norming” of persons is co­ constructed 
through the racing and norming of spaces (and the properties and characteristics 
thereby associated with them).
Just as physical spaces can become gendered and/or racialized, so too can dia­
lectical spaces. A discourse, taken broadly to include spoken, written, signed, etc. 
forms of communication, becomes gendered or racialized when, as a result of 
race or gender associations, perceptions of the discourse and its practitioners are 
consciously or unconsciously shaped by gender or race ideologies. When a par­
ticular identity is socially devalued, this devaluation likewise serves to underwrite 
the devaluation of discourses associated with that social identity. To see how gen­
der and race ideologies influence value perceptions of philosophical discourses 
and their practitioners, consider this memory recounted by feminist bioethicist 
Hilde Lindemann (2006, W15):
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A few months ago, I attended a workshop on metaethics. One morning at 
breakfast, as a handful of guy­ philosophers and I lingered over our coffee, we 
played the game of ranking the various specializations within philosophy 
according to the prestige they enjoy—which not coincidentally, also inversely 
tracks gender. Here’s what we came up with:
Philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaphysics: The 
 alpha­ dominant philosophy, done by Real Men
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Done by manly enough men
Metaethics: Done by men who aren’t entirely secure in their masculinity
Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy: Done by girls
Bioethics: Done by stupid girls.
The entire hierarchy is presumptively white, and explicitly gendered discourses 
were not even ranked. But one can imagine what greater inclusivity might have 
looked like. Feminist philosophy, according to this logic, might be said to be done 
by angry, stupid girls; philosophy of race done by angry, stupid girls of color and 
angry, men of color who—depending on the racial stereotypes at play—either 
aren’t entirely secure in their masculinity or are hyper­ masculine (but not in the 
“right” ways). And so on and so forth. Some variation of this prestige hierarchy is 
likely familiar to many philosophers.
The imbedded juxtaposition of identity descriptors alongside relative intelligence 
descriptors (e.g. “stupid girls”) expressed in this hierarchy reflects a long history of 
prejudicial beliefs concerning the amount of intellect traditionally associated with 
each discourse, where discourses towards the top of the hierarchy are thought to 
require more intelligence than those down below. Consider, for ex ample, the 
 sentiments expressed by P. F. Strawson—philosopher of language and mind, whose 
most widely discussed contributions to philosophy were, perhaps ironically, in 
 ethics—who was known to have frequently joked that “he would turn to moral 
 philosophy only when his powers were waning” (Snowdon and Gomes  2019). 
Indeed, Strawson openly characterized the subfield of ethics as less “intellectually 
gripping”9 than the other areas of philosophy to which he directed most of his 
 attention. Against a backdrop in which only “Real Men” are purported to be endowed 
with the “powers” required to engage in “gripping” phil oso phy, the perception that 
philosophical ethics is easy and that it is “done by girls” is no innocent pairing.10
9 Strawson regarded his two ethics papers to “effectively embody all I have thought or have to say 
in a philosophical area which, important as I recognize it to be, I have never found as intellectually 
gripping as those to which I have given more attention” (Snowdon and Gomes 2019).
10 While some may be tempted to view Strawson as an outlier, see Lloyd (1984) and Rooney (1991) 
for discussion concerning the association of women and irrationality in the history of philosophy. See 
also Leslie et al. (2015) for discussion concerning expectations of innate brilliance and gender distri­
butions across academic disciplines.
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Likewise, Charles Mills observes the existence of two separate “worlds”:
on the one hand, the world of mainstream (i.e., white) ethics and political phil­
oso phy, preoccupied with discussions of justice and rights in the abstract, on the 
other hand, the world of Native American, African American, and Third and 
Fourth World political thought, historically focused on issues of conquest, 
imperialism, colonialism, white settlement, land rights, race and racism, slavery, 
jim crow, reparations, apartheid, cultural authenticity, national identity, indigen­
ismo, Afrocentrism, etc. These issues hardly appear in mainstream political phil­
oso phy, but they have been central to the political struggles of the majority of 
the world’s population. (1997, 4)
As Mills’ characterization illuminates, systemic racist, settler­ colonial, and 
western­ centric biases are activated within smaller intellectual spaces, shaping the 
ways in which racialized content is positioned within the field (if it is granted a 
position at all). Referring to this practice as “exceptionalism,” Kristie Dotson 
argues that this philosophical practice “involves the unfounded [. . .] exclusion of 
large bodies of investigation based upon the privileging of one group (or set of 
groups) and their investigations over others” (2012b, 11). The hierarchy informs, 
facilitates, and justifies exclusionary practices that govern not only who (i.e. what 
social identities) can participate in philosophy, but also about what (i.e. the con­
tent) one must contribute.
Given these observations, we can articulate at least three ways in which a  discourse 
can become social identity­ coded. A discourse can become social identity­ coded 
in virtue of:
 (1) assumptions concerning who the contributors in the discourse are;
 (2) assumptions concerning whose attitudes or interests the discourse reflects 
or serves;
 (3) assumptions concerning the relative ability or intellectual “power” (e.g. 
brilliance, objectivity, rationality, gravitas, etc.) believed necessary to 
engage in the discourse.
Any of the aforementioned can produce epistemic injustice, but we should distin­
guish (1)–(3) for several reasons. First, certain discourses may turn out to be 
identity­ coded in virtue of some, but not all, of these options. For example, ethics, 
as characterized by Strawson, may be gender­ coded in virtue of (1) and (3), but 
not necessarily in virtue of (2). Second, the kind of testimonial injustice prompted 
by (1), (2), and (3) may differ, where (1) and (3) may be more likely to yield an 
identity­ based testimonial injustice and (2) more likely to produce a content­ based 
testimonial injustice. This distinction is important, as practices aimed to 
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reduce the harms of identity­ based testimonial injustice (e.g. anonymous grading 
or peer review, etc.) will likely fail to address the harms of content­ based testimo­
nial injustice; for how does one effectively “anonymize” the content of a contribu­
tion? Finally, the exclusionary effects mediated by (1), (2), or (3) may vary in 
intensity for different contributors and discourses, and they may combine 
together to produce novel harms.
A gendered and racialized hierarchy of discourses largely determines who 
fashions the philosophical terrain, which questions are characterized as philo­
soph ic ally interesting, and what conversations are deemed worth pursuing. 
Higher in the hierarchy are those discourses that are thought (via 1) to be engaged 
primarily by “Real Men”; (via 2) to serve the interests or reflect the attitudes of 
“Real Men” (or to be so highly abstract as to serve the interests of no “man” in 
particular); or (via 3) to require a high level of “power” (e.g. innate intellectual 
ability, objectivity, rationality, gravitas, etc.) associated with “Real Men.” Situated 
much lower in the hierarchy are non­ dominantly gendered and racialized dis­
courses; that is, those discourses thought (via 1) to be engaged primarily by 
women, gender minorities, and/or non­ whites; (via 2) to serve the interests or 
reflect the attitudes of women, gender minorities, and/or non­ whites; or (via 3) to 
not require high levels of ability or “power” for meaningful participation (where 
this last assessment also involves classist and ableist associations).
Thus, identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice constitute dual 
mechanisms through which the epistemic norms of a prejudicial hierarchy are 
structurally preserved in philosophical spaces. Illustrating the first mechanism at 
work, black woman philosopher Anita Allen recalls the disturbing way in which a 
colleague attempted to discourage her from philosophy, openly asserting that she 
did not possess “enough candle power (i.e., intellect)” but possessed “too much 
juice (i.e., sensuality)” for the profession (Allen and Yancy  2018). Likewise, 
Yolanda A. Wilson (2017) writes of a philosophy professor who claimed that phil­
oso phy lacks black participants because they can’t pass a logic requirement and of 
a white male peer who prevented her from collecting her department mail 
because he didn’t think a woman of color could possibly be a graduate student in 
the department. Or Sally Haslanger (2008), who tells of her professor, who shared 
that he believed women were incapable of being first­ rate philosophers, owing to 
their inability to have seminal ideas. In these cases, demeaning race and gender 
stereotypes are mobilized to launch discipline­ specific attacks. Such attacks target 
practitioners in virtue of their social identities (e.g. qua woman, qua black person, 
qua black woman, etc.) to undermine their capacities as epistemic and philo soph­
ic al contributors.
Illustrating the second mechanism at work, consider the statements of black 
feminist philosopher V. Denise James who recalls the following (2014, 192–3):
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After [a] senior philosopher questioned the possibility of my existence as a black 
feminist philosopher, I started calling myself a pragmatist because Dewey’s work 
on democracy came closest to helping me answer the “what do you do?” ques­
tion without betraying my growing desire to do philosophy differently. 
Pragmatist was a name I could stand on. I could locate myself in the profes­
sion . . . Without a “guy,” my status as a philosopher in these settings was tenu­
ous . . . With Dewey as my “guy,” the looks of confusion, of misunderstanding, of 
suspicion lessened, although they did not disappear. Dewey gave me access to a 
professional philosophical community. Although I smuggled in black feminist 
thought from outside of the discipline, as long as pragmatist was the name 
I called myself, I could be understood.
As James reports, the association of a discourse (e.g. black feminist philosophy) 
with a devalued social identity (e.g. black women) serves to exclude and discredit 
the discourse and its primary investigators in academic philosophy; but that same 
discourse, once associated with a valued social identity (e.g. Dewey, the white 
“guy”), is permitted greater inclusion and accreditation within the field. Likewise, 
feminist ethicist Margaret Urban Walker states that practitioners engaged in 
feminist philosophy are “vulnerable to being discredited for not knowing the 
more professionally central discourses,” while practitioners engaged in dominant 
discourses are permitted to “be blithely ignorant . . . or to have mistaken or car­
toonish impressions” of feminist discourses (Walker  2005, 161). This profound 
failure of epistemic reciprocity divests marginalized discourses and their con­
tribu tors of value, creates non­ reciprocal responsibilities for those contributors, and 
ensures that when such discourses do collide, it is disproportionately on dominant 
terms. As James and Walker illustrate, their epistemic and philo soph ic al  participation 
is threatened in virtue of social identity- coded content in their contributions.
4. Not Another Version of . . .
On the hypothesis I am developing, epistemic injustice constrains a contributor’s 
full epistemic participation in a given domain, providing targets with a reason to 
participate less often in such spaces or to avoid such spaces altogether. 
Contributors with non­ dominant social identities and contributors engaged in 
non­ dominant social identity­ coded discourses are both targets of epistemic 
injustice in academic philosophy; thus, both kinds of contributors have reason to 
participate less in academic philosophical spaces or to avoid them altogether. In 
this section, I distinguish my proposal from three alternative accounts, namely, 
the “different voices,” “schema clash,” and “culture of justification” accounts.
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Consider first the “different voices” hypothesis. While many versions exist, the 
proposal generally seeks to explain demographic asymmetries in philosophy by 
appealing to “intrinsic” differences—either natural or socialized—between differ­
ent identity groups (e.g. gender, culture, etc.). On this hypothesis, philosophy’s 
lack of diversity would be explained by the fact that diverse practitioners are 
selected (or self­ selected) out of the field, owing to intrinsic, group­ based unsuit­
ability or disinterest. To this end, theorists have hypothesized differing group­ based 
propensities or preferences concerning philosophical intuitions (Weinberg et al. 
2001; Machery et al.  2004; Buckwalter and Stich  2014), argumentation styles 
(Moulton 1983), or modes of reasoning (Gilligan 1993; Orr 1989). Challenging 
this view, Louise Antony argues that, “the offending characteristic in philosophy 
must track some stable difference . . . or the explanation fails” (2012, 229). The 
existence of stable, intrinsic differences between social groups concerning their 
philosophical intuitions, their reasoning modes, or argumentation styles has not 
been reliably demonstrated, and the hypothesis is empirically unsupported.11 
Moreover, the “different voices” hypothesis assumes controversial and unsubstan­
tiated forms of essentialism, and so we might also reject it on these grounds.
In contrast to this hypothesis, my account proposes a stable—though, im port­
ant ly, not intrinsic—difference shared by underrepresented practitioners: namely, 
an increased susceptibility to epistemic injustice in a range of philosophical spaces. 
First, my proposal explains the underrepresentation of persons with non­ dominant 
social identities in virtue of their increased susceptibility to identity­ based testi­
monial injustice. But the amount of credibility or epistemic standing a person is 
afforded is a decidedly extrinsic feature of that person in that it depends, in large 
part, on an audience’s perceptions of the contributor and contribution. Thus, my 
proposal does not depend on essentialist claims about these contributors con­
cerning, for instance, their actual abilities, interests, intuitions, or philo soph ic al 
preferences. Unlike the “different voices” hypothesis, my account is sensitive to 
the intrinsic heterogeneity within non­ dominant social identity groups, while 
honing in on a key similarity: namely, their increased susceptibility to epistemic 
injustice. On my view, the lack of identity diversity in philosophy is partially 
explained by this “stable difference.”
In addition, however, my proposal also offers an explanation for the lack of 
content diversity observed in the field. As I have argued, not only are contributors 
with non­ dominant social identities increasingly susceptible to epistemic in just­
ice in philosophy (via identity­ based testimonial injustice), but so too are con­
tribu tors engaged in discourses associated with non­ dominant social identities 
(via content­ based testimonial injustice). On my account, the dual and com­
pounding effects of each form of testimonial injustice unify and partially explain 
11 For example, see Fine (2010); Lam (2010); Adleberg et al. (2015), Kim and Yuan (2015).
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the pervasive lack of both identity and content diversity in the field. Thus, my 
account explains more, while making fewer assumptions.
Second, my view should be distinguished from the hypothesis discussed by 
Cheshire Calhoun (2009) and Sally Haslanger (2008) according to which the lack 
of identity diversity in philosophy is attributable to the difficulty diverse practi­
tioners may have in “imagining” (Calhoun 2009, 218) themselves as philosophers, 
owing to divergence between their conceptions of themselves and their concep­
tions of philosophy as white and hypermasculine. Drawing on Virginia Valian’s 
(1998) notion of a schema, Haslanger refers to these divergences as “schema 
clashes” (2008, 212). Haslanger states:
It is difficult for women to feel “at home” in a hypermasculine environment since 
it requires sublimating potentially important aspects of identity; because some 
of the specific elements of masculinity that are emphasized in philosophy are 
also associated with whiteness, the same is true for [racial] minorities. (217)
As my analysis shows, I agree with these theorists that philosophy is white and 
hypermasculine, that it is broadly perceived as such, and that some (or even 
many) diverse practitioners must sublimate important aspects of their identity to 
feel “at home” in the discipline. On the hypothesis I am proposing, however, 
diverse practitioners do not feel “at home” in philosophy because they must contend 
with epistemic and communicative injustices when attempting to participate in the 
field. Thus, my hypothesis avoids generalizations concerning the self­ conceptions of 
diverse practitioners. The problem that I have elucidated, namely, a disproportionate 
susceptibility to epistemic injustice in the field, is explanatory even in the absence 
of any schema clash on the part of diverse practitioners themselves. For on my 
account, it is not the diverse practitioners, but rather their interlocutors, who 
 possess the comparatively curbed imaginations.
Moreover, my account suggests that at least some of the characteristics that 
Haslanger associates with hypermasculinity (and hence, philosophy)—for 
ex ample, competitive, combative, non­ nurturing, and judgmental (217)—may be 
the wrong ones on which to focus. Consider the findings of a study by 
Thompson et al. (2016), which directly examined several hypotheses proposed to 
explain the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. The study examined 
the ease with which women participate in introductory philosophy classrooms, 
and—consistent with my proposal—revealed that women scored “significantly 
lower than men” with respect to their comfort speaking in class (2016, 9). Yet the 
researchers found no evidence to support the hypothesis “that women find Intro 
classes to involve overly aggressive or confrontational discussions” (13). This 
finding suggests that traits like competiveness and non­ nurturance may be insuf­
ficiently explanatory. The researchers did note, however, that no questions directly 
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tested the hypothesis “that men in Intro classes dominate class discussion and 
may be called on more by Instructors, which women notice and dislike” (13). 
Concerning this hypothesis, a survey of existing empirical research cited several 
studies supporting it. The survey found “that women are less comfortable than 
men speaking in class, including expressing their opinions and asking/answer­
ing questions, and that this difference partially accounted for the relationship 
between gender of respondent and their willingness to take more philosophy” 
(Thompson 2017, 7).
Particularly illuminating are the findings of a qualitative study (Lockard 
et al. 2017) utilizing female­ identified focus groups.12 In describing the epistemic 
role of social identity in their classroom experiences, several students noted that, 
with the exception of a “selected” few women, “men dominated the class conver­
sations” (12) and that there were more men than women in their classes. 
Concerning her professor, one student reported that “the girls at the beginning of 
the semester had to have a little more weight behind what they said” (13), while 
several other students mentioned that professors played “favorites.” Alternatively, 
other students noted the role of identity­ coded content, stating that they “wished 
that gender was a topic of conversation even when the material was not explicitly 
about women or gender” (12). The researchers concluded that “students’ ‘class­
room experiences’ . . . might be a more pronounced factor in students’ overall 
assessments of philosophy” (18). Of course, this data is limited both in terms of 
sample size and concerning the range of social identities studied. If, as I have been 
arguing, diverse practitioners are experiencing (or anticipate ex peri en cing) 
epistemic and communicative disadvantages in philosophical exchanges in virtue 
of both identity and content, then our investigations ought to continue to explore 
this hypothesis further.
Finally, let me distinguish my proposal from Kristie Dotson’s (2012b) assess­
ment of the field’s inability to sustain diverse practitioners, in which she identifies 
philosophy’s symptomatic “culture of justification” as a major contributing factor. 
Typified by the centrality of the question “How is this paper philosophy?,” 
Dotson’s account raises concerns about philosophy’s valorization of “justification 
as a method,” which privileges practices of legitimation preoccupied with a singu­
lar set of “presumed commonly­ held, univocally relevant justifying norms” (6). 
She argues that philosophy’s privileging of this method—and the ensuing cul­
ture—creates an inhospitable environment for diverse practitioners in the field, 
who must disproportionately shoulder the burden of justifying their practices, 
projects, canons, and methodologies. She advocates instead for a culture of praxis 
12 Diverse practitioners—especially at the undergraduate level—may not readily identify class­
room discomfort as a consequence of injustice and discrimination or may interpret epistemic barriers 
as evidence of their own philosophical, intellectual, or communicative inadequacies. Consequently, 
qualitative data in which practitioners describe their classroom experiences in greater detail are espe­
cially useful.
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which recognizes a variety of canons, multiple methodologies of disciplinary 
 val id ation, and the value of studying live concerns.
I share with Dotson the view that a culture of praxis within philosophy 
would contribute to the development of a more attractive working environment. 
But my account should be distinguished from Dotson’s for two reasons.13 First, 
content­ based testimonial injustice identifies a more general—and in some 
instances, more superficial—phenomena than that with which Dotson is primarily 
concerned. Because a philosophical discourse can become identity­ coded in the 
absence of methodological divergence or departure from accepted legitimizing 
norms, content­ based testimonial injustice may identify a broader range of 
 contributions with respect to which diverse practitioners may be epistemically 
targeted. Second, however, the proposal I am developing suggests that operating 
alongside—perhaps even prior to—the burden of legitimizing specific projects, 
practices, or methodologies in philosophical spaces, practitioners with 
 non­ dominant social identities are first/also saddled with the burden of simply 
trying to participate in any capacity at all. On my proposal, a contributor may 
ex peri ence barriers to philosophical participation solely in virtue of social 
 identity—regardless of content, project, practice, or methodology. That is, con­
tributors with non­ dominant social identities may experience an inhospitable 
epistemic en vir on ment in philosophy, via identity­ based testimonial injustice, 
while at the same time violating no justificatory norms.14 Thus, while a shift to a 
culture of praxis would undoubtedly increase the range of habitable options 
within the profession (thereby improving the environment for contributors 
engaged in non­ dominant social identity­ coded discourses), it would not necessarily 
improve the ex peri ences of contributors with non­ dominant social identities—and 
especially novice contributors—who (attempt to) engage philosophy’s more 
 conventionally credited discourses. The epistemic environment in those discourses 
would likely remain inhospitable for people with their social identities. To this 
end, the dual mechanisms of identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice 
cast a wider explanatory net.
Ultimately, determining which factors contribute to the demographic dis par­
ities in philosophy is an empirical matter, and it is no doubt true that myriad 
13 It should be noted that Dotson states that she is focused on the “environment of professional 
philosophy for diverse practitioners who have made the choice to pursue philosophy as a career path” 
(emphasis added), and not—as I am presently—on “why traditionally conceived diverse peoples . . . are 
not attracted to philosophy as a career path” (5). Thus, while the view she articulates contributes to 
our understanding of this latter question, she did not intend to provide an explanation. Nonetheless, 
I consider her account here to highlight the relevant differences between our views.
14 Unless, for example, simply possessing a non­ dominant social identity in the philosophy 
 classroom constitutes a departure from justificatory norms on Dotson’s view. If this is the case, then 
I would argue that we ought to distinguish between justificatory norms that exclude persons in virtue 
of their social identities and justificatory norms that exclude persons in virtue of characteristics of 
their contributions. This distinction would not preclude the possibility that some justificatory norms 
could exclude on the basis of both, but it would allow us to track each phenomena independently.
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factors converge to create what Antony (2012) has called “The Perfect Storm.” In 
differentiating my proposal from related accounts, I am not claiming that these 
proposals have no explanatory role, nor am I suggesting that my proposal is the 
only, or even the most important, consideration at play. While my proposal does 
not purport to offer a full explanation, it can, I think, inform our understanding 
of why we continue to make so little progress in our efforts to diversify the field 
and especially why we see a substantial decrease in the proportion who pursue 
philosophy after their first experiences with it. Thus, the account I am proposing 
here should be understood to illuminate a hypothesis which warrants further 
investigation. As Gina Schouten notes, “we have a long way to go before we really 
know which mechanisms are at work. In the meantime, philosophers can deploy 
our own tools of inquiry to improve our discipline” (2016, 276). As I have been 
arguing, the distinction between identity­ based and content­ based testimonial 
injustice is one such tool.
5. The ‘Philosophical Uniqueness’ Objection
One might worry that insofar as diverse contributors are at an increased risk for 
testimonial injustice, this will be true in any academic field and not just in phil­
oso phy. Thus, one might object that my proposal is not suited to explain phil oso­
phy’s peculiar demographic disparities. Indeed, philosophy fares particularly 
poorly in comparison to other humanities disciplines (instead, more closely 
resembling non­ humanities fields like computer science and engineering) and 
this indicates there is something unique about philosophy’s diversity problem. 
Because the mechanisms (e.g. epistemic injustice) deployed in my hypothesis 
are generally widespread, my hypothesis would not explain the exceptional 
dis par ities observed in philosophy. Does my account have anything to say 
about this?
I admit that the effects of epistemic injustice—both identity­ based and 
 content­ based—are undoubtedly widespread (though perhaps not evenly spread) 
throughout the academy. The fact that my proposal can help explain why diverse 
practitioners may likewise be underrepresented in other academic disciplines is a 
virtue of my account. Despite the broader application of my proposal, however, I 
want to suggest several ways in which the effects of pervasive epistemic injustice 
will result in unique disadvantages for philosophers, and especially for novice 
philo sophers at early stages of exposure.
First, it seems to me that the effects of epistemic injustice will be uniquely 
problematic in the discipline of philosophy, a discipline which Laurence BonJour 
has characterized—in a book written for and taught to students—as “essentially 
dialectical in character” (2010, viii, my emphasis added). According to BonJour, 
philosophical practice consists of “arguments and responses and further 
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arguments and further responses back and forth among the different positions on 
a given issue” (viii). While BonJour thinks engagement in this dialectical practice 
is essential for all practitioners in the field, he suggests that such participation is 
especially important for students in the beginning stages of philosophical inquiry. 
Indeed, BonJour states, it “is important for a student who wants to understand 
this dialectical development to become, to some extent at least, a participant 
rather than a mere observer” (viii).
While thoughtful practitioners may challenge BonJour’s conception, this con­
ception of philosophy is commonly held and frequently communicated to many 
students upon their introduction to the field. Insofar as targets of epistemic 
in just ice are denied an equal opportunity to participate in open­ ended dialectical 
exchanges, a practice widely characterized as essential to doing philosophy, their 
ability to participate in the field will be greatly diminished. Indeed, if we recall the 
sorts of difficulties faced by the targets of testimonial injustice (lack of recogni­
tion for one’s contributions, difficulty shaping the direction of conversation, 
limit ed opportunities to disseminate ideas, frequent interruptions, being ignored 
or dismissed), this is precisely the sort of interference that renders participation 
in a dialogic exchange incredibly difficult (not to mention utterly unenjoyable), if 
not completely impossible. In addition to other challenges associated with “doing 
philosophy”—for example, parsing out difficult texts, constructing and evaluating 
arguments, etc.—targets of testimonial injustice must overcome substantial epi­
stem ic and communicative hurdles to engage in basic levels of inquiry. Thus, 
while testimonial injustice is no doubt present in other disciplines, its effects will 
likely introduce discipline­ specific disincentives in the philosophy classroom. 
Insofar as novice philosophers are taught that the very practice of philosophy 
essentially transpires through participation in dialectical exchanges, testimonial 
injustice in the philosophy classroom poses a distinct disadvantage. This is par­
ticularly important considering the fact that for many people, their first and per­
haps only exposure to philosophy as a discipline is in a college classroom, where 
this is not the case for other disciplines like, for instance, English.15
Second, epistemic injustice likely occurs with greater frequency in fields like 
philosophy precisely because diverse practitioners are so seriously underrepresented 
15 One might object that English is similarly dialectical but does not share philosophy’s demo­
graphics. A difference may partly consist in the space between the characterization of a discipline as 
primarily (even centrally) dialectical and as essentially dialectical, where the latter is far more re strict­
ive. Many students in English departments study creative writing, technical writing, grammar, English 
language education, etc., none of which are typically characterized as “essentially dialectical” in 
BonJour’s narrow sense. More importantly, however, it seems to me no accident that while English has 
long validated a variety of communicative media (e.g. plays, autobiography, short stories, poetry, oral 
history), philosophy has not. For a variety of reasons, including economic necessity, expressive poten­
tial, political utility, and the preservation of marginalized intellectual traditions, the philo soph ic al 
contributions of diverse thinkers have historically emerged in an abundance of media beyond the 
singularly prized “philosophical treatise.” Diverse practitioners may find happier homes in academic 
fields where the inclusion of these contributions is regarded as a feature, not a bug.
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in those spaces. There is good reason to think that the effects of identity­ based 
testimonial injustice are less pronounced in exchanges between individuals with 
shared social identities, or, in the case of content­ based testimonial injustice, 
between individuals with shared openness towards the content of a discourse. 
This is plausible for two reasons. First, shared knowledge of the reality of what it 
is actually like to have a certain social identity (or shared knowledge of the value 
of a discourse) fosters epistemic familiarity, removing the epistemic function of 
stereotypes or false ideologies on which non­ group members or non­ participants 
often rely to (mis)assess their interlocutors. Second, when non­ dominantly 
 situated persons experience and reflect upon the false and invalidating nature of 
the prejudicial evaluative practices to which they have been subjected, they are 
often better equipped than their dominantly situated counterparts to identify 
other instances of such practices at work. If this is correct, then the likelihood 
that diverse practitioners will experience testimonial injustice in a given exchange 
decreases as their representation in that environment increases.
Two observations follow. First, philosophy classrooms and spaces in which 
contributors with non­ dominant social identities occupy a critical mass—as 
opposed to being grossly outnumbered—generally reduce (although do not 
entirely eliminate) the likelihood of identity­ based testimonial injustice. Second, 
philosophy classrooms and spaces in which contributors are engaged together 
with shared openness to non­ dominant identity­ coded content—as opposed to 
environments in which this content is denigrated or wholly absent—generally 
reduce (although again, may not entirely eliminate) the likelihood of content­ based 
testimonial injustice. Each of these environments provide different benefits, 
and thus they do not perform the same ameliorative role, but both kinds of en vir­
on ments offer more favorable spaces in which diverse students could consider a 
future in philosophy.16 This observation is thus bittersweet. It is sweet, in that 
small but consistent shifts in the demographics of the field can produce more 
16 Indeed, the average philosophy classroom is typically inadequate in one or both capacities and 
thus provides a subpar environment in which to recruit students to the field. Programs like PIKSI 
(Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute), Compass Workshops, and the Rutgers Summer 
Institute for Diversity in Philosophy have served to develop the first sort of environment, in which 
diverse students are engaged in a broad range of philosophical discourses in spaces in which they 
occupy a critical mass. Unlike these programs, many departments do not have direct control over the 
identities of the students in their classrooms, but departments do have control over the content offered 
at the introductory level (and beyond!). Thus, one way to shift demographics is to provide adequate 
support for and encouragement of content diversity in classes. This extends beyond diversifying the 
contents of a “generalized” introductory syllabi but to also diversifying the range of courses that could be 
offered at the introductory level: for example, Philosophy of Race, Philosophy of Gender, Social and 
Political Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Philosophy of Disability, etc. In this way, diverse students 
would be able to choose from a wider range of content through which to engage philosophically, and 
such courses would naturally provide environments in which students enrolled would be more likely 
to share with one another an openness to the course content. The aim of cultivating classrooms in 
which students demonstrate openness to diverse content and to diverse identities is crucial, as merely 
diversifying a syllabus does not by itself reduce the possibility of testimonial injustice in the classroom.
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sizeable impacts down the road. It is bitter, however, in that attracting diverse 
students into philosophy under the auspices that the field will thereby be hos pit­
able to them is morally suspect. Indeed, there is an undeniable moral tension in 
recruiting diverse practitioners into an inequitable working environment because 
the environment needs more diverse practitioners to become equitable. From this 
perspective, it appears as though philosophy needs to have its diversity problem 
fixed before it can truly fix its diversity problem.
6. A Distinction without a Difference?
Utilizing a distinction between identity­ based and content­ based testimonial 
injustice, I have developed a two­ pronged epistemic explanation for the lack of 
diverse practitioners in academic philosophy. I argued that (i) contributors with 
non­ dominant social identities and (ii) contributors engaged in non­ dominant 
social identity­ coded discourses are both susceptible to epistemic injustice in the 
field. While the former are targeted in virtue of their social identities, the latter 
are targeted in virtue of the content of their contributions; the injustices ex peri­
enced by contributors at the intersections are dual and hybrid.
One advantage of my proposal, then, is that it connects the underrepresenta­
tion and marginalization of (i) and (ii), while avoiding circular analysis. But one 
might wonder whether a non­ circular analysis is useful. There is evidence to sug­
gest that philosophers engaged in gender discourses in the field are more likely to 
be women and gender minorities and that those engaged in race discourses are 
more likely to be people of color.17 Given this overlap, why not just explain the 
underrepresentation of one in virtue of the other, or vice versa? Indeed, one might 
wonder whether a non­ circular analysis—and hence the distinction between 
identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice—is useful. That is, does 
the analysis employ a distinction without a difference?
First, although (i) and (ii) overlap, they are not identical. For instance, many 
(though not all) philosophers of race are people of color, and not all people of 
color in philosophy have interests in philosophy of race (or other race­ coded 
17 Haslanger (2010) found that feminist philosophy was among the most frequent areas in which 
women published and was the least frequent area for men. Schwitzgebel and Jennings (2017) found 
that the proportion of women in ethics—broadly construed to include social and political philosophy, 
philosophy of race, gender, and sexuality, aesthetics, normative ethics, applied ethics, and philosophy 
of law—“substantially exceeded the proportion in other areas of philosophy among U.S.­ranked fac­
ulty [Philosophical Gourmet Report], recent job placements, APA program participants, authorship 
in elite journals, highly cited authors, and targets of extended journal article discussion” (29). Paxton 
(n.d.) reported that the philosophical subfield of philosophy of race, gender, and sexuality is 81 per 
cent women. Botts et al. (2014) found that the top areas of specialization for US black philosophers 
were Africana, race, social and political, ethics, and continental philosophy; for black women philo­
sophers, these areas were race, ethics, continental, social and political, and feminism.
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discourses). Likewise, while most practitioners engaged in gender discourses are 
women and gender minorities, many women and gender minorities in phil oso­
phy are not engaged in these discourses. My proposal is compatible with existing 
overlap without presuming overlap or relying on overlap to generate an ex plan­
ation. Persons with non­ dominant social identities possess a variety of philo soph­
ic al strengths and interests. Our efforts to diversify the field must be attentive to 
overlap without blurring the distinction between identity and philosophical 
interest. If we treat (i) and (ii) interchangeably or collapse them, we risk foreclos­
ing a wide range of philosophical opportunities for persons with non­ dominant 
social identities—especially for those in the earlier stages of philosophical 
exploration.
Second, distinguishing between (i) and (ii)—and thus between identity­ based 
and content­ based testimonial injustice—is useful because it enables us to articu­
late why structural and institutional efforts aimed to ameliorate one form of 
injustice can fail to address (and can even exacerbate) problems of the other. 
Consider, first, how efforts to ameliorate identity­ based testimonial injustice can 
proceed in the absence of attention to content. Imagine a philosophy graduate 
program that, during the five years in which a graduate student might be enrolled, 
facilitates approximately 30 invited philosophy talks (averaging, say, 6 talks a 
year). Suppose that during this time, 100 per cent of the speakers are white and 
80 per cent of the total speakers invited are cisgender men. Moreover, all of the 
invited speakers—regardless of social identity—give talks in mainstream epis­
tem ol ogy, metaphysics, philosophy of language, mind, and, perhaps, occasionally 
ethics or history. Suppose, further, that the department eventually becomes con­
cerned with the demographics of their department colloquia and diligently 
works to introduce greater diversity in the race and gender identities of their 
speakers. Yet, as it turns out, none of the newly invited speakers work in areas 
outside the mainstream. While the department has made efforts to alleviate the 
effects of identity­ based testimonial injustice, they have done nothing to remedy 
the effects of content­ based testimonial injustice. Concerning the kinds of dis­
courses in which invited speakers are engaged, the resulting colloquia looks 
exactly the same as it did before.
These exclusions are detrimental to the epistemic and professional lives of 
those practitioners who are pre­ emptively passed over, but these harms have a 
more expansive reach. Invited talks serve to expose graduate students to phil oso­
phy’s breadth and to demonstrate the range of inquiries it is possible for one to 
undertake as a philosopher; they provide students with opportunities to learn 
from and interact with other professionals who share their interests and to 
develop conversational competence in areas of philosophy about which they are 
less knowledgeable. Patterned content exclusions deprive students of these oppor­
tunities, effectively communicating to them that such content does not belong in 
philosophy departments. (This message is likewise communicated through 
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curricula, concerning the kinds of courses offered and required for  students to 
advance professionally.) Students unfamiliar with diverse discourses will continue 
to remain ignorant of them due to lack of exposure, and students with interests 
(or potential interests) in these areas will be less likely to pursue them if they 
perceive that such interests have no place in the profession more broadly. Some 
students may leave the discipline to pursue these interests elsewhere. Because 
graduate students already provide a substantial portion of existing undergraduate 
instruction (especially at the introductory level) and constitute the pool from 
which the next generation of faculty and instructors are selected, the effects of 
content­ based testimonial injustice reverberate throughout the profession. 
Transformative interventions at the level of colloquia and curricula require a 
collective expectation that familiarity with and respect for diverse discourses are 
an integral part of a philosophy education; such interventions demand the 
intentional inclusion of valued and adequately compensated practitioners who 
knowledgeably engage in these investigations in their teaching and research. In 
the absence of explicit attention to content, efforts that increase identity diversity 
may produce limited effects at the level of discourse.
By the same token, interventions aimed at increasing content diversity in phil­
oso phy can fail to address identity­ based inequalities. Consider, for example, the 
recent publication of a journal symposium on Black Lives Matter, in which no 
contributions from black philosophers were included. In an open letter to the edi­
tors, Chris Lebron (2017)—a black philosopher who has written extensively on 
Black Lives Matter—observed that, in the five years leading up to the symposium’s 
publication, the journal:
has not published a single article on the philosophy of race: voting, elections, 
immigration, global markets, and animals have gotten their time in the journal’s 
sun. But as black Americans, and the philosophers who study racial inequality—
a political philosophical problem—have directly engaged one of our era’s most 
sinister moral and political quandaries, the journal has failed to represent race 
in its pages. Maybe more damning, so far as I can tell, not one black philosopher 
has seen her or his work appear in the pages of your respected journal, on race 
or any other topic.
As Lebron notes, the journal’s publication record reveals a systemic two­ fold lack: 
the contributions of black philosophers (regardless of content) and contributions 
to race discourses (regardless of the identities of the contributors) are perpetually 
absent.18 Against this backdrop, the publication of a special symposium on Black 
Lives Matter in which no black philosophers are included is particularly glaring. 
18 One might respond that if the problem lies in the fact that black contributors did not submit 
their work, then the fault does not lie with the journal. This response is inattentive to the mechanisms 
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By failing to include any black thinkers—not even flagging the troubling irony 
of  this deficiency—the possibility of black participation in that platform was 
 pre­ emptively foreclosed. To be clear, the claim that black­ identified perspectives 
were wrongfully erased should not be confused with the claim that no non­ black 
voices ought to have been included. As Lebron states, “[i]t is important that there 
be a range of viewpoints on a matter that is democratically urgent—we are all 
involved in this problem.” But the wholesale absence of black perspectives disre­
gards the contributions of persons whose identities are most centrally relevant to 
the content considered. What such a case illustrates is that efforts towards greater 
content inclusivity in a given domain can further exacerbate identity­ based testi­
monial injustice. While identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice 
are inextricably linked, their remedies have not necessarily advanced hand 
in hand.
Finally, the distinction between identity­ based and content­ based testimonial 
injustice allows us to identify the potentialities and pitfalls associated with vari­
ous positions which diverse practitioners in the field may occupy. This under­
standing can facilitate the development of more accurate guidance and mentoring 
structures for less advanced diverse practitioners as they navigate their own place 
in the discipline. Furthermore, efforts to implement institutional, structural, and 
interpersonal changes in the field will be more successful with greater knowledge 
of the unique forms of vulnerability or advantage that attach to each position. 
Indeed, not all who are marginalized in the field are equally marginalized. Those 
with comparative social privilege may enact epistemic injustice within the mar­
gins, and institutional remedies often favor the most privileged.
To this end, consider first the position occupied by contributors picked out by 
(i) above exclusively. Because their primary engagements are in dominantly cred­
ited discourses, they are not generally at risk for content­ based testimonial in just­
ice. Such contributors are, however, more likely to find themselves to be “the only 
one” with their identity in a given domain. Because, as I have argued, severe 
underrepresentation increases the likelihood that one will be targeted, such con­
tribu tors may face exceptional epistemic barriers—in the form of identity­ based 
testimonial injustice—in exchanges with dominant interlocutors. In many 
instances, such barriers may entirely preclude opportunities for participation. 
This may explain the continued, disproportionate underrepresentation of persons 
with non­ dominant social identities in dominantly credited philosophical dis­
courses; occupation within those spaces may be lonely and discouraging. When 
successfully attained, however, acceptance within a dominantly credited dis­
course can usher in sizeable advancements in one’s epistemic (and professional) 
through which testimonial injustice—operating pre­ emptively and structurally—could unjustly prod­
uce this effect.
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standing. For such contributors, the deployment of language and conceptual 
frameworks associated with dominantly valued discourses renders one’s partici­
pation acceptable—even welcomed—insofar as one’s philosophical contributions 
do not generally disrupt underlying hierarchies of value and displacement. 
Nonetheless, the privileged positions attained by such individuals provide unique 
platforms from which to actively implement structural change. What is called for 
are seismic shifts in the practices of inclusion, visibility, and accreditation, and 
those occupying a position of enhanced professional legibility can utilize their 
status to help facilitate these goals.
By contrast, contributors picked out exclusively by (ii) above may experience 
increased susceptibility to content­ based testimonial injustices in virtue of their 
engagement in dominantly devalued discourses, but their comparatively priv il­
eged social identities largely shield them from more systemic forms of epistemic 
disadvantage. Because a privileged social identity can sometimes (though not 
always) inoculate against the force of content­ based testimonial injustice, these 
contributors may be better positioned to engage devalued discourses in certain 
domains. For such contributors, however, increased susceptibility to content­ based 
testimonial injustice is perfectly compatible with the fact that their participation 
in those discourses may itself perpetuate further epistemic inequalities against 
others. For example, some contributors may lack an appropriate standing—they 
may coopt contributions developed by more marginalized contributors or they 
may produce false or distorting information within a discourse. (This, too, can 
happen when contributors with devalued social identities are engaged in 
 discourses associated with devalued social identities that are not their own.) Thus, 
mere participation in a discourse does not guarantee that one’s contributions 
within that discourse will be justified, even if one assumes some epistemic risk—
via content­ based testimonial injustice—in participating. Institutional change 
requires networks of allied participants transforming the practices through which 
knowledge is collectively produced, but such networks will foster further inequality 
if the participation of the relatively privileged serves to crowd out or appropriate 
contributions of those whose interests are centrally at stake.
Consider, finally, those practitioners occupying positions at the intersections of 
(i) and (ii). These practitioners are vulnerable to an assemblage of identity­ based 
and content­ based testimonial injustices. Perhaps, owing to frequent acts of dis­
missal or discrediting, they have been prevented from participating in dominantly 
credited discourses in which they have genuine interests. Perhaps they have been 
pigeon­ holed into discourses concerning their identities, as these discourses are 
prejudicially deemed more “fitting” for persons like them (Davis  2016). Some 
may be pressured or coerced into engaging in such discourses, where their epi­
stem ic labor is thereby exploited for the benefit of dominant interlocutors and 
institutions (Berenstain 2016). Others may engage non­ dominant discourses to 
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enrich connections with communities or to preserve and develop intellectual 
 traditions that are centrally important to them. For others, engagement in such 
discourses constitutes what Camisha Russell identifies as deliberate occupation, 
much like “the way that one might occupy a lunch counter, an administrative 
building, or Wall Street . . . in protest or as a sort of demand for recognition” 
(2019, 184).
Because of the unique relationship between their identities and the discourses 
they engage, these practitioners negotiate a constellation of epistemic double 
binds as they navigate the profession. Does one become a discredited contributor 
in a dominantly credentialed discourse or a credentialed contributor in a 
 dom in ant ly discredited discourse? Such practitioners may discover that the 
only discourses in which their contributions are not actively rejected are those 
discourses which centrally concern their social identities. Alternatively, they 
may be dis credit ed for participating in identity­ coded discourses precisely 
because they are judged to lack objectivity with respect to the subject matter. 
They may be assessed as too partial in their investigations or find that their 
contributions are dismissed as self­ serving or self­ interested. A double bind 
tightens into a Gordian knot.
Since marginalized discourses remain largely separate from dominant­ occupied 
discourses, however, these discourses may provide practitioners with 
 intra­ discursive epistemic advantages. Practitioners with non­ dominant social 
identities are more likely to constitute a critical mass in these spaces, and many 
practitioners may find that such spaces offer comparably better epistemic en vir­
on ments in virtue of this fact.19 With greater freedom from the dictates of dom in­
ant voices, marginalized discourses have long provided increased opportunities 
for philosophical participation, collective contestation, professional affirmation, 
and enhanced disciplinary (and interdisciplinary) imagination. But this observa­
tion by no means justifies their institutionalized marginalization. As Margaret 
Urban Walker states, “[s]egregation, here as elsewhere, does not conduce to equal 
respect” (2005, 160). Persons with non­ dominant social identities deserve equal 
access to philosophical institutions, and institutionalized marginalization does 
not constitute such access.
This is the overarching institutional context into which diverse students arrive. 
The interrelation between identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice 
is mediated by a plurality of individual perceptions and biases, systemic ideolo­
gies, organizational practices, structural hierarchies, and institutional networks of 
entrenched power. Epistemic justice in philosophy thus requires increased atten­
tion to the multiple ways in which these influences work together to advantage or 
19 To say that an epistemic environment is comparably “better” is not to deny the real effects of 
unjust exclusionary practices or intra­ level prejudices and hierarchies. The environment need not be 
an epistemic utopia to appear better than the alternatives.
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disadvantage differently situated contributors across a wide range of contexts. As 
Lebron (2017) puts it, “diversity really is an ethically important ideal.” As this 
chapter has argued, diversity is also an epistemically important ideal.
7. The Epistemic Harm of Content- Based Testimonial Injustice
Part of the task of this chapter was to conceptually distinguish between two forms 
of testimonial injustice. One might worry, however, that I have not adequately 
shown that content­ based testimonial injustice is an epistemic injustice, in that I 
have not articulated its unique epistemic harm. The precise nature of the epi­
stem ic harm of testimonial injustice is a matter of ongoing debate. On one view, 
for instance, testimonial injustice constricts a targeted contributor’s exercise of 
one’s own epistemic subjectivity, in accordance with dominant interests (Pohlhaus 
Jr  2014). On another view, epistemic injustice objectifies targeted contributors 
and demonstrates a basic lack of respect for their capacities as knowers 
(Fricker 2007). In central cases, the relevant social identities (and attendant preju­
dices) are the sort that “track” targets across a variety of social contexts—render­
ing them susceptible to further injustices in various domains (e.g. legal, economic, 
etc.). A commonality across various accounts is that testimonial injustice harms 
contributors in their epistemic capacities and takes on a broader—that is, sys­
temic—epistemic significance. Given this understanding, how ought we charac­
terize the harm of content­ based testimonial injustice and to whom does it befall? 
Two worries present themselves in answering this question. First, one might 
worry that because content­ based testimonial injustice is not directly (or, in 
hybrid cases, not exclusively) prompted by the targeted contributor’s social iden­
tity, it is not obvious in what way the contributor is harmed. Second, one might 
worry that because content­ based testimonial injustice arises in fairly localized 
contexts, the associated harm therefore lacks any systemic significance. I address 
each in turn.
Let me first articulate the epistemic harm experienced directly by targeted con­
tribu tors. Consider two cases introduced by Fricker. The first case concerns a 
group of scientists who, upon submitting a manuscript to a journal, receive a 
credibility deficit from a panel of referees harboring a “dogmatic prejudice” 
against the authors’ research method. The second case involves a small group of 
philosophers of science at an international science conference—predominately 
attended by research scientists and historians of science—where “simply falling 
into the identity category ‘philosopher of science’ renders one’s word likely to be 
dismissed as . . . vain speculations” (28). Though Fricker does not distinguish 
between identity­ based and content­ based testimonial injustice, she characterizes 
both cases as instances of testimonial injustice. But the testimonial injustices 
involved are, she says, incidental, rather than systematic. That is, the relevant 
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prejudices—about a scientific research method or the professional identity 
 ‘phil oso pher of science’—are restricted to the highly localized academic contexts 
in which they arise. Thus, these are not the sort of structural prejudices that 
 “render the subject vulnerable to any other kinds of injustice” (27) in additional 
domains, such as visiting a doctor’s office, filing through airport security, or taking 
out a loan, etc.
To say that incidental testimonial injustices generally lack the broader social 
significance of systematic cases, however, is not to say that such harms are neces­
sarily morally inconsequential for those targeted. Indeed, says Fricker, “localized 
prejudices and the injustices they produce may be utterly disastrous for the sub­
ject, especially if they are repeated frequently [. . .] the accumulation of incidental 
injustices may ruin their life” (29). Thus, while systemic and incidental testimo­
nial injustice are different in kind, incidental testimonial injustice may nonethe­
less be harmful (and especially so when persistent).
With this distinction in mind, what are we to make of the cases I have con­
sidered throughout this chapter, in which contributors engaged in non­ dominant 
social identity­ coded discourses experience testimonial injustice in academic 
philosophy. One might think these cases—which I have identified as content­ based 
testimonial injustices—are analogous to the academic science cases described 
above. Accordingly, one could argue that the testimonial injustices experienced 
by contributors engaged in gender or race discourses in philosophy are inciden­
tal; that is, they are to be explained by the fact that such contributors employ 
methods against which mainstream philosophical audiences harbor “dogmatic 
prejudices” or that the professional identities “feminist philosopher” and 
 “philosopher of race” are subject to localized identity prejudices in the field. 
Supposing this were true (as it may well be in some instances), classifying these 
testimonial injustices as incidental would not be to say that the targeted con tribu tors 
are not experiencing testimonial injustices. Rather, it is to say that they ex peri ence 
epistemic harms that only disadvantage them in a particular domain. But the 
 localized nature of the harm does not dissolve the claims to justice that those  targeted 
have against those who unjustly target them within that domain. Indeed, even if 
the harm did not take on any larger social significance, it would nonetheless warrant 
some ameliorative response within the localized contexts in which it arises.20
20 Because there is some risk that this conceptual tool will be misappropriated, I emphasize here 
that testimonial injustice picks out epistemic exclusions that are unjust. Thus, testimonial injustice 
cannot be used to theorize the justified marginalization or rejection of epistemic contributions that, 
for example, have been shown to be untenable (e.g. phrenology) or which exclusively serve to foster 
and preserve injustice (e.g. white supremacy). Excluding such content is not appropriately theorized 
as an injustice, not even incidental. Consequently, testimonial injustice will not be an appropriate 
mechanism for explaining all instances of epistemic exclusion in a given domain, and not all exclu­
sions require an ameliorative response.
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This analysis of the harm of content­ based testimonial injustice—as it affects 
the targeted contributor directly—concerns one mode of epistemic subjectivity, 
namely, regarding epistemic subjects in their capacities as subjects who know 
(who inquire, understand, etc.). Epistemic subjectivity, in this mode, concerns 
persons in their capacities to testify, to share, to investigate, and to otherwise engage 
meaningfully in an epistemic exchange. Both identity­ based and content­ based 
testimonial injustice can harm targeted contributors in this first mode. 
Identity­ based testimonial injustice thwarts a contributor’s epistemic subjectivity 
in virtue of one’s social identity, where this harm is appropriately characterized as 
systemic. Content­ based testimonial injustice thwarts a contributor’s epistemic 
subjectivity in virtue of identity­ coded content in one’s contribution, where this 
harm is appropriately characterized as incidental. Because it is incidental, the 
epistemic significance of content­ based testimonial injustice for the targeted 
 con tribu tor will thus depend upon a range of contextual factors. For example, 
when targeted contributors occupy comparatively privileged social positions, the 
constraints on their epistemic subjectivity introduced by content­ based testimo­
nial injustice may be highly localized or infrequent (and in some cases, the effects 
may be rendered morally insignificant). For less privileged contributors, however, 
the epistemic harm will be more substantial, especially when the injustices are 
per sist ent. For those contributors who are vulnerable to both identity­ based and 
content­ based testimonial injustice, incidental content­ based testimonial in just ices 
may intertwine with and magnify the wider range of systemic constraints on their 
epistemic subjectivity.
But an analysis that locates the epistemic harm of content­ based testimonial 
injustice exclusively at the level of targeted contributors in individual exchanges 
will obscure its broader significance. This is because the cases I have considered 
are not wholly analogous to Fricker’s cases. As I have argued, content­ based testi­
monial injustice is mediated by a perceived link between the content of a con­
tribu tor’s contribution and social identities that are systemically devalued. Thus, 
in the cases with which I have been concerned, it is not—or at least not exclu­
sively—a disfavored methodology or a highly localized professional identity that 
is the object of prejudice. Rather, contributors engaged in non­ dominant social 
identity­ coded discourses are subject to epistemic injustice because of identity 
prejudice concerning people with non- dominant social identities. Unlike prejudice 
against a disfavored method or professional identity, this prejudice is neither 
locally restricted nor domain specific; rather, the underlying prejudice is sys­
temic—so systemic, in fact, that it not only serves to discredit people with 
 non­ dominant social identities themselves, but also serves to discredit those who are 
engaged in discourses variously associated with them (and, especially, those dis­
courses perceived to advance their interests). Thus, more can be said in defense of 
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the claim that the harm of content­ based testimonial injustice is not merely 
 incidental, but also systemic.
To identify the systemic epistemic harm of content­ based testimonial injustice, 
we must consider a second mode of epistemic subjectivity. Epistemic subjectivity, 
in this second mode, concerns persons in their capacities as subjects to be known; 
that is, as subjects about whom knowledge can be produced and disseminated. As 
subjects to be known, persons and their interests are taken seriously, their ex peri­
ences are rendered legible, and their collective perspectives are engaged and 
understood. Content­ based testimonial injustice tracks content by, about, and 
associated with persons with non­ dominant social identities. By fostering the 
idea that such content does not matter, content­ based testimonial injustice pre­
cludes broader engagement with discourses through which marginalized persons 
can be understood and appropriately valued. It thereby serves as a mechanism 
through which dominant audiences remain willfully ignorant of those discourses 
(Pohlhaus Jr 2012), despite the fact that they exist and that there are contributors 
who work to cultivate and share them (Mason 2011). In this way, content­ based 
testimonial injustice contributes to a process of systemic erasure and foreclosure 
through which marginalized persons are rendered “unknowable,” a concept 
Kristie Dotson (following Fannie Barrier Williams) theorizes as “a trifold struc­
ture of disappearing” (2017, 426) constituted by disregard, disbelief, and dis­
avowal. As subjects to be known, persons and their experiences are regarded both 
as knowable and worth knowing. Thus, content­ based testimonial injustice sys­
tem at ic al ly thwarts the epistemic interests of marginalized persons in this sec­
ond mode.21
21 One might wonder how content­ based testimonial injustice relates to hermeneutical injustice. Do 
the two overlap in some capacity or does one contribute to the other? Hermeneutical injustice 
picks out “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from col­
lective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical 
resource” (Fricker 2007, 155), where contra testimonial injustice, “no agent perpetrates hermeneutical 
injustice—it is a purely structural notion” (159). Like hermeneutical injustice, content­ based testimo­
nial injustice involves structural identity prejudice, which, in the latter case, operates mechanistically 
through social identity­ coded content. But while content­ based testimonial injustice can operate 
purely structurally (consider, for instance, academic journal practices), many of the cases I have con­
sidered are perpetrated by identifiable agents in testimonial or otherwise dialectical exchanges. 
Moreover, unlike hermeneutical injustice, content­ based testimonial injustice need not involve any 
conceptual lacuna or obscured intelligibility on the part of the marginalized, and it rejects the notion 
of a “collective” hermeneutical resource as neutral with respect to issues of group domination and 
marginalization. While it is possible for content­ based testimonial injustice to thwart the creation of 
conceptual resources (and hence, for it to contribute to this aspect of hermeneutical injustice), it more 
frequently targets the broader dissemination of already existing resources. In this sense, the problem 
of content­ based testimonial injustice is primarily communicative, rather than conceptual. It should 
be noted, however, that Fricker (2016) has since distinguished between midway, minimal, and max­
imal cases of hermeneutical injustice, where midway cases do not involve “any confused experiences 
whatever, but only frustratingly failed attempts to communicate them to members of an out­ group” 
(167). Content­ based testimonial injustice may overlap more extensively with these “midway” cases, 
but if the central problem of midway cases is largely communicative, it less clear why they should be 
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The cooperative interplay between these two modes of epistemic subjectivity—to 
know and to be known—illuminates the interdependent nature of identity­ based 
testimonial injustice and content­ based testimonial injustice. Describing what 
she calls “imperial harm,” Camisha Russell (2019) argues that marginalized 
 persons can be harmed in their capacities to be known when dominant others 
regard them as mere objects of knowledge. Such harms occur when dominant 
interlocutors and institutions purport to have produced exclusive or exhaustive 
knowledge concerning the marginalized, or where dominant discourses super­
sede discourses produced by those occupying the very subject positions under 
consideration. As Russell’s analysis reveals, respect for marginalized persons in 
their capacities to be known therefore requires respect for them in their capacities 
to know (and especially, for instance, about themselves, their identities, their 
communities, their histories, their needs, and their experiences). A proper regard 
for marginalized persons in their capacities as subjects who know, then, necessi­
tates a proper regard for those discourses associated with their collective inquiry, 
for such discourses are both process and repository of their knowledge. Thus, 
identity­ based testimonial injustice and content­ based testimonial injustice are 
inextricably linked. If epistemic justice requires the elimination of one, it requires 
the elimination of both.
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